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ABSTRACT 
 
Studies of open school policies predict house prices to rise in areas that gain access to high-
quality schools.  However, excess demand may limit access to high-quality schools. We take 
advantage of changes in Chicago’s schools admission policies to test whether a higher 
probability of admission to magnet schools for students living within 1.5 miles leads to higher 
house prices. Results indicate that the 1997 and 2009 reforms increased house prices for homes 
within the 1.5-mile radius by about 5.4% and 14%, respectively. The premium is higher for 
homes in low SES areas near multiple magnet schools. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
School choices are typically tied to residential location decisions in the United States.  
Particularly at the elementary school level, enrollments are apt to be restricted to students living 
within in relatively small neighborhoods near the school.  One result of these restrictive 
enrollment policies is that households who value education will be willing to pay a premium to 
live in districts with high-quality schools.  The empirical literature on the capitalization of school 
quality into house prices is sufficiently large to have generated two recent reviews (Machin, 
2011 and Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger, 2011), both of which conclude that households are willing 
to pay a significant premium to live in neighborhoods with schools whose students have high test 
scores. 
In contrast to these closed enrollment policies, many districts offer a form of open 
enrollment.  Students may have the option to attend any school within their district or sometimes 
even in another school district.  The theoretical literature on open enrollment policies (e.g., Epple 
and Romano, 2003; Ferreyra, 2007; and Nechyba, 2000, 2003) suggests that house prices will 
rise in areas with lower-quality schools, while house prices decline in areas whose schools 
receive large numbers of outside students.  Reback (2005) found evidence supporting both 
predictions in a study of Minnesota school districts following the adoption of an inter-district 
open enrollment policy.  Brunner, Cho, and Reback (2012) also find evidence supporting these 
predictions using data from 12 states that had adopted inter-district choice programs as of 1998.  
Analyses of intra-district open enrollment policies reach similar conclusions:  house prices rise in 
																																								 																				
1 Co-authored with Leonardo Bonilla and Daniel McMillen. Paper in submission process for publication 
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areas with low-quality schools and house prices fall in areas with high-quality schools (Machin 
and Salvanes, 2010; Schwartz, Voicu, and Horn, 2014).   
The question addressed in these papers is whether the presence of school choice is 
capitalized into house values.  Choices are more valuable if they can clearly be granted.  In some 
districts, access to high-quality schools is limited by enrollment caps.  A mechanism is required 
to allocate enrollment when there is excess demand for a school.  Local students typically get 
priority, while out-of-district may be determined by some form of lottery. 
In this study, we analyze the effects of school choice on house values within a single, 
large school district, the Chicago Public School (CPS) district.  Chicago designated a set of 
magnet schools in response to a desegregation order in 1980.  Although any Chicago student 
could potentially enroll, a citywide lottery system was used to grant admission.  The lottery 
included minority quotas, but students living near a school were not given priority.  A reform 
affecting only elementary schools was introduced in December 1997 assigning higher 
probabilities of admission to students who lived within 1.5 miles of a magnet elementary school.  
Higher probability of admission was also granted to students with a sibling already attending the 
school.  Another round of reform was introduced in December 2009 after the desegregation order 
was rescinded.  The 2009 reform increased the percentage of seats that could be assigned based 
on proximity to the school from 30% to 40%, and it removed the restriction on the number of 
seats that could be assigned to siblings.  The effect of these reforms was to significantly increase 
the probability of admission for a student living within 1.5 miles of a magnet elementary school.  
These two reforms serve as a natural experiment allowing us to determine whether the 
higher probability of potential admission is capitalized into house prices.  Following an approach 
introduced by Black (1999) and followed by a host of subsequent authors, we compare house 
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prices on either side of the 1.5-mile boundary to determine whether the reforms altered home 
values significantly.2  In addition to a standard set of housing characteristics, we include a full set 
of census tract fixed effects to control for unobserved neighborhood characteristics.  We find that 
the 1997 reform increased property values within the 1.5-mile zone by approximately 5.4%.  The 
2009 reform had an even larger effect of about 14%, although in this recessionary period the 
main effect was to greatly reduce the amount by which prices fell.  Separate estimates for census 
tract socioeconomic status quartiles suggest that appreciation rates are highest for homes in 
relatively low-status areas.  Quantile estimates suggest that while the 1997 reform had only a 
modest effect on the overall distribution of house prices, the 2009 reform produce a marked 
rightward shift in the price distribution, with the shift being most pronounced in the middle of 
the price distribution.  
Although our study’s main contribution to the literature is to establish that 
geographically-based admission probabilities have a significant effect on house prices, our 
results also have implications for the literature on school quality.  Magnet schools are high-
quality schools, and although admission is not restricted to high-achieving students, the students 
who are attracted to magnet schools are those who place a high value on education.  Thus, our 
study supports recent work by such authors as Brasington and Haurin (2006); Clapp, Nanda, and 
Ross (2008); Hoxby (2004); Kane, Staiger, and Samms (2003); Kane, Rieg, and Staiger (2006); 
and Rouse and Barrow (2009) showing that school quality and academic performance affects 
property values.  The results suggest that the benefits of magnet schools’ availability is relatively 
																																								 																				
2	Example of studies using geographical discontinuities to estimate causal effects of schools on house values include 
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007); Bogart and Cromwell (2000); Fack and Grenet (2010); Gibbons and Machin 
(2003); Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2013); Ries and Somerville (2010); Schwartz, Voicu, and Horn (2014); and 
Agarwal, et al. (2015)	
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progressive in the sense that homeowners with low to moderate incomes place the highest value 
on higher admission probabilities. 
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CHAPTER 23 
 
CHICAGO’S MAGNET SCHOOLS 
 
 The history of Chicago’s magnet school system is discussed in Allensworth and 
Rosenkranz (2000).  The CPS established Chicago’s magnet schools in response to a 1980 
desegregation consent decree signed with the federal government.  The original goal of the 
decree response was to increase the percentage of white students in the CPS from its low level in 
1980 (less than 20%) by establishing a set of high-quality schools that would attract white 
students.  Since Chicago’s neighborhoods are highly racially segregated, neighborhood-based 
school admissions produce racially segregated schools.  The magnet schools had racial quotas 
ranging from 15% - 35% white.  “The hope was that by offering special schools, children from 
all over the city would be attracted to them.  Thus, a multiracial student body could be achieved 
in some schools in a system that had far too many racially isolated schools due to the housing 
pattern segregation that existed (and still exists) in Chicago” (Allensworth and Rosenkranz, 
2000, p. 7). 
 Elementary schools classified as “regular magnets” were created in direct response to the 
consent decree and were subject to the racial quotas.  Another set of schools was created that 
were not subject to the quotas, including “scholastic academies”, “regional gifted centers”, 
“classical schools”, and “academic centers”.  Of these, all but the scholastic academies were 
limited to high-achieving students.  The categories of magnet high schools are similar:  
“traditional magnets” were subject to racial quotas, while “regional college preparatory schools” 
and “international baccalaureate programs” had no quotas but were limited to high-achieving 
students.  As admission policies for categories of magnets other than regular elementary magnets 
																																								 																				
3 Co-authored with Leonardo Bonilla and Daniel McMillen. Paper in submission process for publication 
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have not changed significantly over time and continue to be citywide, only regular magnets are 
included in our empirical analysis, and the remainder of the section focuses on this category of 
magnet school. 
 Prior to 1997, a general, citywide lottery was conducted to allocate admissions for all 
magnet schools, including the regular magnets.  A result of the excess demand for magnet school 
enrollment was that students living near a school might be denied enrollment.  In response, the 
CPS now conducts a “proximity lottery” that reserves a portion of the enrollment slots for 
students living within 1.5 miles of a regular magnet school.  The proximity lottery was 
announced in December 1997 and was implemented for the 1998 – 1999 school year.  In the first 
school year, 15% of the enrollment slots were reserved for the neighborhood.  The percentage 
has been 30% since the 2000 – 2001 school year.  The neighborhood is defined using straight-
line distance from the student’s address to the school.   
 The proximity lottery still leaves excess demand for many regular magnet schools.  To 
assure that siblings can attend the same school, beginning in 1997 45% of the enrollment slots 
were set aside for siblings of students who already attend the school.  Finally, 5% of the 
enrollment slots were reserved for allocation at the principal’s discretion.  The combination of 
the proximity lottery and the provision for siblings provides a strong incentive for families with 
children to choose a home in an area within 1.5 miles of a regular magnet. Since most 
elementary school attendance boundaries are smaller than 1.5 miles4, this mechanism will 
incentivize not only neighborhood students, but also outside students.  Moreover, some regions 
fall within the requisite 1.5 miles of as many as 5 magnets.  Since families can enter the 
																																								 																				
4 https://data.cityofchicago.org/Education/Chicago-Public-Schools-Elementary-School-Attendanc/e75y-e6uw 
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proximity lottery for all schools with 1.5 miles of their home, these regions are especially 
valuable. 
 In September 2009, a federal court decision vacated the desegregation consent decree.5  
In December 2009, the Chicago Board of Education approved a new admissions policy for 
magnet schools.  The most significant changes were the elimination of race-based admissions 
criteria and the removal of the restriction that no more than 45% of the seats were reserved for 
siblings. After all siblings are enrolled, 40% of the remaining seats are now reserved for students 
living within 1.5 miles of a regular magnet school, regardless of race.  Proximity lotteries are 
conducted if the number of neighborhood applicants exceeds 40% of the available seats.  
However, race and ethnicity continues to matter.  According to the Chicago Public Schools 
Policy Manual, “In an effort to ensure ongoing diversity in these programs, if more than 50% of 
the entire student body, according to the 20th day file, is comprised of students within the 
proximity and if more than 50% of the student body is any one racial or ethnic group, no 
proximity lottery will be held for that school.” 6   
 Students who are not admitted as a sibling or via the proximity lottery can still gain 
admission to a magnet school through the Citywide SES Lottery.  “SES” is an acronym for 
“socio-economic status.”  A score for socio-economic status is assigned to each census tract 
based on six criteria:  median family income, adult educational attainment, the percentage of 
single-parent households, the percentage of home ownership, the percentage of the population 
that speaks a language other than English, and a school performance variable.  The school 
																																								 																				
5 According to the CPS web site, whites currently account for 9.4% of enrollment.  Hispanics now form the largest 
group, with 45.6% of total enrollment. African-Americans comprise 39.3% of total enrollment, which stood at 
234,679 for elementary schools and 112,029 for secondary schools in Fall 2014.  These figures are drawn from 
http://cps.edu/About_CPS/At-a-glance/Pages/Stats_and_facts.aspx. 
6 http://policy.cps.k12.il.us/download.aspx?ID=82. 
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performance variable is based on ISAT scores for schools with attendance areas in the census 
tract.  The Chicago Public Schools Policy Manual includes the following summary of the 
Citywide SES Lottery”: 
“Lotteries will be conducted within each of the four SES tiers and applicants will 
be ranked in lottery order within each tier.  If there are insufficient applicants 
within a tier to fill the allocated number of seats in that particular SES tier, the 
unfilled seats will be divided evenly and redistributed across the remaining tier(s) 
as the process continues.  A sufficient number of offers will be made in lottery 
order for each SES tier to fill the seats allocated to this lottery process.  The 
remaining applicants will be placed on an applicant wait list by SES tier.”  
http://policy.cps.k12.il.us/download.aspx?ID=82, p. 4. 
 
The new admission policy was implemented for the 2010-2011 school year.  The effect 
of removing the racial quotas, increasing the proximity lottery share to 40%, and expanding the 
number of seats allocated to siblings is to provide a strong incentive for families with children to 
live in areas that are within 1.5 miles of one or more magnet schools.  Even if a student 
ultimately attends a private or parochial school, owning a home near a magnet school may serve 
as a form of insurance for parents that their child will not be forced to attend a low-quality 
school.  Thus, house prices can be expected to rise for homes that are within 1.5 miles of a 
magnet school. 
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CHAPTER 37 
 
DATA 
 
  Our primary data source is DataQuick, which provided data on house sales for Chicago 
for 1997-2012.  We then expanded the sample to include data from 1993-1996 using data from 
the Illinois Department of Revenue.  DataQuick also provided information on lot size, building 
area, house age, the number of bathrooms, and indicators that the home has central air 
conditioning, brick construction, or a fireplace.  Comparable data for 1993-1996 are drawn from 
the Cook County Assessor’s Office.  As DataQuick relies on the same data sources when 
constructing their sales files, the two sets of data are directly comparable.  Most of our analysis 
focuses on two sub-periods encompassing the reform dates – 1995-2000 and 2007-2012.  
Focusing on these sub-periods helps to isolate the effects of the reforms and avoids 
complications arising from the booming housing markets of 2003-2006.   
 We restrict the sample to sales of Class 2 homes that are within 3 miles of a regular 
magnet school that had opened before 1998.  The Cook County Assessor’s Office defines Class 2 
properties as residential buildings with 6 units or fewer.  Condos are also excluded from the 
analysis because we do not have data on structural characteristics for them.  Table 1 provides the 
list of magnet schools included in the analysis, and Figure 1 shows their locations within the city 
along with 1.5 mile radius circles around them. 
 Descriptive statistics for the two sub-periods of data are presented in Table 2.  Averages 
for most variables are similar for homes in areas affected by the reforms and for homes located 
more than 1.5 miles from a magnet school.   
																																								 																				
7 Co-authored with Leonardo Bonilla and Daniel McMillen. Paper in submission process for publication 
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CHAPTER 48 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
 Following Black (1999) and much of the subsequent literature, we use a differences-in-
differences approach to estimate the effect of the admission reforms on house prices.  Letting 𝑙𝑛𝑃!!" represent the log sale price of home h in census tract c at time t, the basic estimating 
equation is 𝑙𝑛𝑃!!" = 𝛾!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!! + 𝛾!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!!𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚! + 𝑋!!𝛽 + 𝜇! + 𝜌! + 𝑢!!" 
for either sub-period used to evaluate the reforms (i.e. 1995-2000 or 2007-2009).  We include 
fixed effects for the quarter of sale and the census tract, and standard errors are clustered at the 
tract level.9  The estimating equations also include controls for structural characteristics, 
including log building area, log lot size, building age, the number of bathrooms, and dummy 
variables for central air conditioning, brick construction, and a fireplace.10 
 Two reforms took place during our sample period, one at the end of 1997 and the other at 
the end of 2009.  As the geographic area covered by the reforms does not differ over time, the 
Treat variable is the same for both reform times:  Treat  = 1 if a home is within 1.5 miles of a 
magnet school. To evaluate the December 1997 reform, we estimate models using data for 1995 
– 2000, while we use data from 2007 – 2012 to analyze the December 2009 reform.  For the 
1995 – 2000 data, 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚! = 1 for t ≥ 1998:1, while 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚! = 1 for t ≥ 2010:1 for the 2007 – 
2012 data.   
																																								 																				
8 Co-authored with Leonardo Bonilla and Daniel McMillen. Paper in submission process for publication 
9	The results are similar when elementary school districts are used as the basis for geographic fixed effects rather 
than census tracts.  Census tracts are smaller than school districts:  for our sample of sales of homes that are within 
1.5 miles of a magnet school, there are 817 census tracts and 339 elementary school districts.			
10 Implicitly, the estimating equations also include controls for the Reform97 and Reform09 variables.  However, 
these variables are not separately identified from the controls for quarter of sale. 
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As geographic coding can imprecise – e.g., addresses can be measured from the center of 
a lot, at the street, or even in the center of the street fronting the house – we omit observations 
lying within a buffer of ε miles around the 1.5 mile mark.  We set the buffer to ε = 0.125, 
which is the length of a standard block in Chicago, which excludes observations for which the 
distance (d) between the home and the nearest magnet school lies in the range 1.375 < d < 1.625.  
For our base model, an observation has Treat  = 1 if the distance from the home to the nearest 
magnet school lies in the range d ≤ 1.375, while Treat  = 0 for observations in the range 1.625 ≤ 
d ≤ 3.   
We then vary the size of the bands around the critical 1.375 and 1.625 mile marks by 
estimating models with the sample restricted to sales of homes located in Treat = 1 bands of 1.5 
–  δ ≤ d ≤ 1.5 – ε and Treat = 0 bands of 1.5 + ε ≤ d  ≤ 1.5 + δ.  In addition to our base 
estimates for which δ = 1.5, we test three smaller bandwidths:  δ = 1, 0.5, and 0.25. Figure 2 
illustrates this process.  Smaller values of δ lead to fewer observations for both the treatment 
and control groups as the sample is restricted to a narrower band around the critical 1.5 – ε and 
1.5 + ε distances.  Observations are likely to be more similar across the treatment and control 
groups for narrower bandwidths.  The housing characteristic variables and census tract fixed 
effects control for heterogeneity introduced by having the larger samples produced by wider 
distance bands.   
 A sizable portion of the sample is located in areas of the city that are within 1.5 miles of 
more than one magnet school.  Table 3 shows the number of observations that are within a 1.5 
miles of 0-4 schools for each of the four distance bands.  Even when δ = 0.25, more than 10% 
of the treatment observations are within 1.5 miles of 2 or more magnet schools.  To measure the 
effects of treatment intensity – the number of nearby magnet schools – on house prices, we add 
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separate 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥  𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 variables for observations that are close to 2 or 3-4 
schools.   
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CHAPTER 511 
 
MAIN RESULTS 
 
Figure 3 shows the path of median house prices over time for the control and treatment 
observations for δ = 1.5.  The paths look very similar for other values of δ.  The vertical lines 
indicate the start of the first quarter following the December 1997 and December 2009 reform 
dates, i.e., 1998:1 and 2010:1.  Median prices start at nearly identical levels for control and 
treatment observations in 1993, but a wedge forms before the 1997 reform, after which median 
prices are significantly higher for properties closer to the magnet schools.  The treatment 
premium does not vary greatly over the subsequent decade.  The 2010 reform appears to have 
averted some of the collapse in house prices that began in late 2007.  Prices fell much more for 
control properties than for homes close to magnet schools.  Although prices rose again for 
control properties after 2010, the discount for control properties remains larger at the end of 2012 
than it had been in earlier years.12     
Table 4 presents our primary regression results.  All sales within 3 miles of a magnet 
school are included in this set of regressions, i.e., δ = 1.5.  The regressions include controls for 
the quarter of sale and census tract fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by census tract. 
The results for the structural characteristics are standard.  Sales prices are estimated to be 
higher for bigger, newer homes on larger lots.  Prices are also higher for homes with more 
																																								 																				
11 Co-authored with Leonardo Bonilla and Daniel McMillen. Paper in submission process for publication 
12	Figure 3 suggests that the reforms may have been anticipated prior to their formal announcement, particularly in 
2009.  The Federal Court decision in September 2009 was the result of a long process, with the Desegregation 
Consent Decree first modified in 2004 and then amended in 2006 (Jackson, 2010).  The final and decisive changes 
were introduced in 2009 when the Consent Decree was rescinded.  As early as January 2009 CPS officials signaled a 
probable move from race to socioeconomic status as factors influencing admissions decisions (http://catalyst-
chicago.org/2009/09/federal-judge-ends-chicago-schools-desegregation-decree/). 	
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bathrooms, brick construction, and a fireplace.  The only anomaly is the negative sign for central 
air conditioning in the 1995-2000 regressions, but the estimated coefficients turn to the expected 
positive value in the later time period.  The key results are listed last in Table 4.  The results for 
1995-2000 indicate that prices rose by approximately 5.4% in areas that had admission 
probabilities increased by the 1997 reform.  The results for 2007-2012 indicate that the effect 
was of the 2009 was larger at 14.7%.   
Table 4 also presents the results for treatment intensity.  For both time periods, the 
interactions between the number of nearby magnets and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥  𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  (i.e., within 1.5 miles 
of a magnet school, post-reform) imply a higher treatment effect for homes that are within 1.5 
miles of a larger number of magnet schools.  The results for the 1995 – 2000 period imply that 
house prices rose by 3.3% after the 1997 reform for homes that are within 1.5 miles of one 
magnet school, by 10.9% for homes that are near two schools, and by 13.1% for homes that are 
near three or four schools.  Comparable figures for the 2009 reform are 12.9%, 8.4%, and 37.2% 
for homes that are within 1.5 miles of 1, 2, or 3-4 schools.   
Table 5 shows how the results vary as the bandwidth around the 1.5-mile mark varies.  
The results are quite similar when δ is reduced from 1.5 to 1, but the estimated coefficients for 
Treatment x Reform fall to 0.046 for 1995 – 2000 and 0.109 for 2007 – 2012 when δ = 0.5.  
The estimates remain statistically significant at the 5% level for 1995 – 2000 and at the 10% 
level for 2007 – 2012 for the narrowest bandwidth, δ = 0.25.   
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CHAPTER 613 
 
PLACEBO TESTS 
 
  In this section, we report the results for two sets of placebo tests.  First, we use an 
incorrect definition of the treatment area:  any home within 0.5 miles of a magnet school is 
defined as having received the treatment of a higher probability of admission.  With δ set to 
either 0.25 or 0.5, this treatment definition means that both “treatment” and “control” 
observations have actually been beneficiaries of the reforms.  Thus, we should not expect to find 
statistically significant estimates for the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥  𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  variables.  The results are shown in 
Table 6.  As expected, none of the estimated coefficients for or 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥  𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 are 
statistically significant in either time period. 
 As another check on the accuracy of our models, we estimate a set of regressions with an 
incorrect definition of the treatment date.  We define the treatment date as December 1994 rather 
than December 1997 and restrict the sample to sales from 1993-1996.  In this case, none of the 
observations has received a higher probability of admission.  The results are shown Table 7.  As 
expected, the incorrect treatment is indicated to have no effect on house prices, with the possible 
exception of the largest bandwidth (δ = 1.5), where the estimated coefficient is much lower than 
its counterpart in Table 4 (0.054 vs. 0.014). 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
13 Co-authored with Leonardo Bonilla and Daniel McMillen. Paper in submission process for publication 
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CHAPTER 714 
 
TREATMENT OF HETEROGENEITY 
 
 In this section, we relax the assumption that the effect of the reforms is the same for all 
households.  According to the U.S. Census, 17% of Chicago’s high school students were enrolled 
in private schools in 2003, with 2/3 of these students attending Catholic schools (Sander, 2003).  
Although private schools often offer some need-based scholarships, they remain costly for many 
lower-income households.  Moreover, only 21% of Chicago’s households had children under 18 
in 2000.  High-income households who can readily afford private school tuition may have little 
interest in Chicago’s magnet schools except as a form of insurance, while the primary interest in 
childless households in the proximity of a magnet school may be its effect on the ability to sell 
the home in the future.   
 Although we do not observe any demographic data for the households represented in our 
sample, house size is a potential proxy for the presence of children.  Table 8 shows the results of 
estimating separate regression for small (≤ 1100 s.f.) and large (≥ 2250 s.f) homes.15  The 1997 
reform has an effect for large houses for all delta except 0.25.  The 2009 reform does appear to 
have a significant effect on house prices that is always much higher for large homes.  These 
results are as expected if the tendency for larger homes to hold children makes their owners 
willing to pay a larger premium for proximity to magnet schools. 
 To test whether the premium for magnet schools varies with income, we take advantage 
of the “socio-economic status” scores produced for each census tract by the Chicago Public 
																																								 																				
14 Co-authored with Leonardo Bonilla and Daniel McMillen. Paper in submission process for publication 
15 These figures are approximate versions of the 25th and 75th percentiles for building areas.  The exact values are 
1091 and 2280 s.f. 
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Schools’ Office of Access and Enrollment (www.cpsoae.org).  The composite score is based on 
median family income, adult educational attainment, the percentage of single-parent households, 
the percentage of home ownership, the percentage of the population that speaks a language other 
than English, and a school performance variable.  The score ranges from 1 – 4, with 1 
representing low socioeconomic status.  The four scores divide the census tracts into 
approximate quartiles. 
 Table 9 shows the results for the four SES scores when δ = 1.5 and ε = 0.125.  For both 
1995 – 2000 and 2007 – 2012, the estimated coefficients for 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 are significantly 
higher for the lower two SES scores than for observations in higher-status census tracts.  The 
estimates are statistically insignificant at the 5% level for observations in census tracts with the 
highest SES score.  Overall, the results suggest that the benefits of the reform were progressive 
in the sense that the increase in the premium associated with magnet school proximity is highest 
for observations in low-status census tracts. 
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CHAPTER 816 
 
QUANTILE REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 If treatment effects are highest in low-status census tracts, we might expect the 
distribution of house prices to shift further to the right for the left side of the distribution.  In this 
section, we estimate a series of quantile regressions to determine whether the effects of the 
reforms vary across the distribution of house prices.  With 817 census tracts and 24 quarters in 
each six-year time interval, some simplifications are necessary to make estimation feasible.  We 
follow a two-stage estimation procedure proposed by Canay (2011) to control for census tract 
fixed effects.  The first stage is our basic linear regression model, which includes controls for 
both census tracts and the quarter of sale.  The first-stage regression provides estimates of the 
census tracts fixed effects, 𝐷𝛼, where D is the 𝑛 𝑥 817 matrix of census tract indicator variables.  
Under the assumption that α does not vary across quantiles, the second stage is a standard 
quantile regression of 𝑙𝑛𝑃 − 𝐷𝛼 on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚, X, and controls for the time of 
sale.  As a further simplification, we use a cubic function to control for time in the second stage 
quantile regressions: 𝛿! 𝑞 − 𝑞! ! + 𝜆! 𝑞 − 𝑞! !𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚!!!! , where q represents the quarter 
of sale.  This specification allows for different time trends before and after the reform dates.   
 Table 10 presents the quantile regression results for the Treat and Treat x Reform 
variables for three quantiles, τ = 0.10, 0.50, and 0.90, when δ = 1.5 and ε = 0.125.  For 1990-
2000, the estimated coefficients for 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 are larger for the low and high quantiles 
than for the median.17  In contrast, the estimated coefficient for 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 is highest for 
																																								 																				
16 Co-authored with Leonardo Bonilla and Daniel McMillen. Paper in submission process for publication 
17 Standard errors are reported conditional on the first-stage estimates and are not clustered by census tract.   
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τ = 0.90 and lowest for τ = 0.10.  However, this simple set of three values for τ conceals 
much additional variation.  Figure 4 shows the estimated coefficients for the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 
variables as τ ranges from 0.02 to 0.98 in increments of 0.01.  The results suggest that the 1997 
reform had its highest effect on low quantiles, while the 2009 reform’s effect peaks at quantiles 
near 0.80.  Models 3 and 4 allow the effects to vary by treatment intensity.  As expected, the 
estimated treatment effects are higher for homes in areas that are near more magnet schools.   
 To better illustrate the effects of the reforms on the full distribution of house prices, we 
use an approach pioneered by Machado and Mata (2005) to estimate the effect of discrete 
changes in an explanatory variables on the distribution of house prices.18 At each quantile from 
τ = 0.02, 0.03, …, 0.98, we predict the sale price at the time just after the reform using the 
following equation: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃 = 𝛾!(𝜏)𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛾!(𝜏)𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝑋𝛽(𝜏) 
+ 𝛿!(𝜏) 𝑞 − 𝑞! ! + 𝜆!(𝜏) 𝑞 − 𝑞! !  𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚!!!!  
with X set at the actual values in the data set and q = 13, i.e., the first quarter after the reform.  To 
analyze the effects of the reform on the treated observations (Treat = 1), we compare the 
predictions for observations within 1.5 miles of a magnet school for 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 = 0 and 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 = 1.  The result is a set of 𝑛!𝑥 97 predicted values for 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 = 0 and 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 = 1, 
where 𝑛! is the number of observations with Treat = 1.  We then estimate kernel density 
functions using the full set of entries for each matrix.  A comparison of the estimated kernel 
																																								 																				
18 The approach used here is discussed in more detail in McMillen (2015).
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densities shows the shift in the full distribution of house prices for the treated observations due to 
the reform. 
 The results are shown in Figure 5.  For 1995-2000, the distribution of house prices shifts 
to the right by a relatively small amount.  The shift is somewhat larger on the left side of the 
distribution than at high prices.  The shift is much larger for 2007-2012.  The result of the 2009 
reform is to shift the distribution well to the right, particularly for prices near middle-left portion 
of the distribution. 
 The procedure can also be used to simulate the effect of the reforms for alternative 
treatment intensities.  The 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 are interacted with the variables 
NumSchools indicating whether the treated observation is within 1.5 miles of 1, 2, or 3-4 schools.  
We again estimate quantile regression for τ = 0.02, 0.03, …, 0.98.  The next step is to calculate 
the full set of 𝑛! 𝑥 97 predictions for 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 = 0 and 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 = 1 for NumSchools = 1, 2, 
and 3-4.  The results are shown in Figure 6.  For 1995-2000, the effect of the 1997 reform is now 
seen to be quite pronounced for homes near 2 or 3-4 magnet schools. The 2009 reform is 
estimated to produce a still larger rightward shift in the price distribution.  For both reforms, the 
shifts are concentrated in the middle of the price distribution.   
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CHAPTER 919 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The literature on school choice has largely neglected the need to ration spaces in high-
quality schools.  Having the right to apply for admission to a school does not guarantee a student 
a seat.  The option may well be valuable, as suggested by the studies by Reback (2005), Cho, and 
Reback (2012), Machin and Salvanes (2010), and Schwartz, Voicu, and Horn (2014), all of 
which suggest that house prices rise in areas that gain open enrollment in high-quality schools.  
However, the premium should be higher if students have a higher probability of receiving a seat 
in the desirable schools. 
 We take advantage of changes in admission policies for magnet schools to test whether a 
higher probability of admission to high-quality schools leads to higher house prices.  Chicago’s 
magnet schools were created in response to a 1980 desegregation consent decree.  Although 
regular magnet schools did not restrict admission to high-achieving students, there soon was an 
excess demand for seats as they gained a reputation as high-quality schools.  At the end of 1997, 
Chicago introduced a proximity lottery that increased the probability of admission to students 
living within 1.5 miles of a magnet school.  When the consent decree expired in 2009, Chicago 
again increased admission probabilities for students living within this radius by removing racial 
quotas, eliminating a restriction on the proportion of a school’s enrollment devoted to siblings, 
and increasing the proportion of the seats allocated to students living within the 1.5-mile radius.  
Using data on house sales for 1993 – 2012, we find strong evidence that these admission 
reforms increased prices for homes within 1.5 miles of a magnet school as compared to homes in 
																																								 																				
19 Co-authored with Leonardo Bonilla and Daniel McMillen. Paper in submission process for publication 
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neighboring areas that did not benefits from the reforms.  Prices are estimated to have increased 
by at least 3% result of the 1997 reform.  The premium is still higher – in the 10% - 13% range – 
for the subset of homes in areas for which admission probabilities rose dramatically as a result of 
being within the 1.5-mile radius of more than two schools.  The 2009 reform is also estimated to 
have a large effect on house prices, with homes within the 1.5-mile radius earning a premium of 
more than 10% over more distant housing.  The 2009 appears to have helped homes within 1.5 
miles of a magnet school avoid some of the dramatic drop in house prices that occurred during 
the late 2000s.  Separate estimates for census tract socioeconomic status quartiles suggest that 
appreciation rates are highest for homes in relatively low-status areas, while quantile estimates 
suggest treatment effects are most pronounced for homes with prices in the middle of the overall 
distribution. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. List of Magnet Schools Operating in 1997 
Albert	R	Sabin	Elementary	Magnet	School	
Andrew	Jackson	Elementary	Language	Academy	
Burnside	Elementary	Scholastic	Academy	
Edward	Beasley	Elementary	Magnet	Academic	Center	
Frank	W	Gunsaulus	Elementary	Scholastic	Academy	
Franklin	Elementary	Fine	Arts	Center	
Galileo	Math	&	Science	Scholastic	Academy	Elementary	School	
Hawthorne	Elementary	Scholastic	Academy	
Inter-American	Elementary	Magnet	School	
Jensen	Elementary	Scholastic	Academy	
John	H	Vanderpoel	Elementary	Magnet	School	
LaSalle	Elementary	Language	Academy	
Leif	Ericson	Elementary	Scholastic	Academy	
Maria	Saucedo	Elementary	Scholastic	Academy	
Mark	Sheridan	Elementary	Math	&	Science	Academy	
Ole	A	Thorp	Elementary	Scholastic	Academy	
Robert	A	Black	Magnet	Elementary	School	
Stone	Elementary	Scholastic	Academy	
Turner-Drew	Elementary	Language	Academy	
Walt	Disney	Magnet	Elementary	School	
Walter	L	Newberry	Math	&	Science	Academy	Elementary	School	
William	Bishop	Owen	Scholastic	Academy	Elementary	School	
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School 
1.5 – 3 Miles from a  
Magnet School 
1995 -2000 2007 -2012 1995 -2000 2007 -2012 
Log of Sale Price 11.847 (0.710) 
12.058 
(1.108) 
11.639 
(0.615) 
11.644 
(1.085) 
Log of Building Area 7.434 (0.507) 
7.453 
(0.505) 
7.327 
(0.472) 
7.355 
(0.467) 
Log of Lot Size 8.158 (0.351) 
8.114 
(0.400) 
8.248 
(0.271) 
8.219 
(0.297) 
Age/10 7.287 (3.187) 
8.205 
(3.673) 
7.322 
(2.462) 
8.597 
(2.800) 
Bathrooms 2.070 (1.104) 
2.207 
(1.171) 
1.810 
(0.937) 
1.919 
(0.972) 
Central Air Conditioning 0.238 (0.426) 
0.274 
(0.446) 
0.159 
(0.365) 
0.177 
(0.382) 
Brick 0.611 (0.488) 
0.611 
(0.488) 
0.557 
(0.497) 
0.536 
(0.499) 
Fireplace 0.113 (0.317) 
0.101 
(0.301) 
0.072 
(0.258) 
0.067 
(0.250) 
Number of Observations 48,683 35,217 51,799 38,367 
  
Note.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Number Observations by Distance Range and Number of Magnet Schools within 1.5 
Miles 
Nearby  
Schools 
1995 – 2000 2007 – 2012  
Treat = 1: 
1.5 – δ ≤ d 
≤ 1.5 – ε  
Omitted: 
1.5 – ε < d 
< 1.5 + ε 
Treat = 0: 
1.5 + ε ≤ d 
≤ 1.5 + δ 
Total 
Treat = 1: 
1.5 – δ ≤ d 
≤ 1.5 – ε  
Omitted: 
1.5 – ε < d 
< 1.5 + ε 
Treat = 0: 
1.5 + ε ≤ d 
≤ 1.5 + δ 
Total 
δ = 1.5, ε = .125 
0 0 5,125 46,674 51,799 0 3,943 34,424 38,367 
1 31,713 5,031 0 36,744 20,748 3,663 0 24,411 
2 7,128 191 0 7,319 6,990 161 0 7,151 
3 4,124 24 0 4,148 3,271 27 0 3,298 
4 461 11 0 472 350 7 0 357 
Total 43,426 10,382 46,674 100,482 31,359 7,801 34,424 73,584 
δ = 1.0, ε = .125 
0 0 5,125 33,262 38,387 0 3,943 25,072 29,015 
1 25,983 5,031 0 31,014 17,602 3,663 0 21,265 
2 5,618 191 0 5,809 5,339 161 0 5,500 
3 2,287 24 0 2,311 2,014 27 0 2,041 
4 461 11 0 472 350 7 0 357 
Total 34,349 10,382 33,262 77,993 25,305 7,801 25,072 58,178 
δ = 0.5, ε = .125 
0 0 5,125 15,202 20,327 0 3,943 11,750 15,693 
1 13,050 5,031 0 18,081 9,257 3,663 0 12,920 
2 2,019 191 0 2,210 1,785 161 0 1,946 
3 703 24 0 727 686 27 0 713 
4 123 11 0 134 94 7 0 101 
Total 15,895 10,382 15,202 41,479 11,822 7,801 11,750 31,373 
δ = 0.25, ε = .125 
0 0 5,125 5,177 10,302 0 3,943 3,883 7,826 
1 4,715 5,031 0 9,746 3,176 3,663 0 6,839 
2 450 191 0 641 396 161 0 557 
3 86 24 0 110 104 27 0 131 
4 1 11 0 12 0 7 0 7 
Total 5,252 10,382 5,177 20,811 3,676 7,801 3,883 15,360 
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Table 4. Estimated Differences in Differences Effects on House Prices, δ = 1.5 and ε = .125 
 
Variable 1995-2000 2007-2012 1995-2000 2007-2012 
Log of Building Area 0.333 (0.007) 
0.295 
(0.010) 
0.334 
(0.007) 
0.296 
(0.010) 
Log of Lot size 0.255 (0.011) 
0.350 
(0.018) 
0.255 
(0.011) 
0.350 
(0.018) 
Age/10 -0.024 (0.001) 
-0.044 
(0.002) 
-0.024 
(0.001) 
-0.044 
(0.002) 
Bathrooms 0.011 (0.003) 
0.020 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.003) 
0.019 
(0.004) 
Central Air Conditioning -0.010 (0.005) 
0.059 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.005) 
0.060 
(0.008) 
Brick 0.053 (0.005) 
0.098 
(0.008) 
0.053 
(0.005) 
0.098 
(0.008) 
Fireplace 0.061 (0.007) 
0.057 
(0.011) 
0.061 
(0.007) 
0.057 
(0.011) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a Magnet School 0.020 (0.032) 
-0.025 
(0.037)   
Within 1.5 Miles of a Magnet School, 
Post-Reform 
0.054 
(0.010) 
0.147 
(0.024)   
Within 1.5 Miles of 1 Magnet School   
0.032 
(0.032) 
-0.021 
(0.037) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 2 Magnet 
Schools   
0.006 
(0.037) 
0.069 
(0.043) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 3-4 Magnet 
Schools   
-0.056 
(0.046) 
-0.051 
(0.057) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 1 Magnet School, 
Post-Reform   
0.033 
(0.011) 
0.129 
(0.024) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 2 Magnet 
Schools, Post-Reform   
0.109 
(0.020) 
0.084 
(0.039) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 3-4 Magnet 
Schools, Post-Reform   
0.131 
(0.013) 
0.372 
(0.048) 
R2 0.728 0.749 0.729 0.750 
Number of Observations 90,100 65,783 90,100 65,783 
 
Notes.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the log of sale price.  The 
regressions include controls for the quarter of sale and census tract fixed effects.  The post-reform dates 
are defined as 1998 and later for the 1995 – 2000 sample and 2010 and later for the 2007 – 2012 sample.   
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Table 5. Variation in Distance Bands 
Variable δ = 1.5, ε = .125 
δ = 1, 
ε = .125 
δ = 0.5, 
ε = .125 
δ = 0.25,  
ε = .125 
1995 – 2000 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School 
0.020 
(0.032) 
0.022 
(0.032) 
0.023 
(0.033) 
0.024 
(0.033) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School, Post-1997 
0.054 
(0.010) 
0.051 
(0.011) 
0.046 
(0.014) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
Number of Observations 90,100 67,611 31,097 10,429 
2007 – 2012 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School 
-0.025 
(0.037) 
-0.025 
(0.037) 
-0.017 
(0.038) 
-0.013 
(0 .042) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School, Post-2009 
0.147 
(0.024) 
0.145 
(0.026) 
0.109 
(0.036) 
0.085 
(0.047) 
Number of Observations 65,783 50,377 23,572 7,559 
 
Notes.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the log of sale price.  The 
regressions include controls for structural characteristics, the quarter of sale, and census tract fixed 
effects. 
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Table 6. Treatment Defined as Within 0.5 Miles of a Magnet School 
Variable δ = 0.25, ε = 0 δ = 0.5, ε = 0 
1995 – 2000  
Within 0.5 Miles of a Magnet School 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
Within 0.5 Miles of a Magnet School, Post-1997 
0.015 
(0.020) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
Number of Observations 14,417 27,531 
2007 – 2012 
Within 0.5 Miles of a Magnet School 
-0.021 
(0.021) 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
Within 0.5 Miles of a Magnet School, Post-2009 
0.020 
(0.037) 
0.044 
(0.035) 
Number of Observations 10,419 19,537 
 
Notes.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the log of sale price.  The 
regressions include controls for structural characteristics, the quarter of sale, and census tract fixed 
effects. 
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Table 7. Reform Date Defined as 1994 
 
 
δ  = 1.5, 
ε = .125 
δ = 1, 
ε = .125 
δ = 0.5, 
ε = .125 
δ = 0.25,  
ε = .125 
Within 1.5 of a Magnet School 0.040 (0.031) 
0.041 
(0.031) 
0.051 
(0.032) 
0.047 
(0.035) 
Within 1.5 of a Magnet School,  
Post-1994 
0.014 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
Number of Observations 59,803 44,376 20,315 6,940 
 
Notes.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the log of sale price.  The 
regressions include controls for structural characteristics, the quarter of sale, and census tract fixed 
effects.    The sample includes data from 1993-1996. 
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Table 8. Estimates for Small and Large Homes 
 
Variable δ  = 1.5, ε = .125 
δ = 1, 
ε = .125 
δ = 0.5, 
ε = .125 
δ = 0.25,  
ε = .125 
1995 – 2000, Small Homes (≤ 1100 s.f.) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School 
0.089 
(0.040) 
0.086 
(0.040) 
0.080 
(0.041) 
0.061 
(0.047) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School, Post-1997 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
0.022 
(0.024) 
Number of Observations 23,910 17,955 7,991 2,796 
2007 – 2012, Small Homes (≤ 1100 s.f.) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School 
0.014 
(0.068) 
0.018 
(0.068) 
0.013 
(0.067) 
0.015 
(0.074) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School, Post-2009 
0.102 
(0.031) 
0.094 
(0.033) 
0.088 
(0.044) 
0.048 
(0.060) 
Number of Observations 16,339 12,279 5,579 1,861 
1995 – 2000, Large Homes (≥ 2250 s.f.) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School 
-0.056 
(0.037) 
-0.052 
(0.038) 
-0.029 
(0.040) 
-0.023 
(0.055) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School, Post-1997 
0.131 
(0.016) 
0.127 
(0.018) 
0.098 
(0.027) 
0.046 
(0.039) 
Number of Observations 22,808 17,335 8,004 2,698 
2007 – 2012, Large Homes (≥ 2250 s.f.) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School 
-0.145 
(0.058) 
-0.144 
(0.060) 
-0.128 
(0.064) 
-0.143 
(0.078) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School, Post-2009 
0.228 
(0.039) 
0.223 
(0.044) 
0.177 
(0.064) 
0.133 
(0.083) 
Number of Observations 17,668 13,699 6,492 2,053 
 
Notes.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the log of sale price.  The 
regressions include controls for structural characteristics, the quarter of sale, and census tract fixed 
effects. 
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Table 9. Variation by Census Tract Socioeconomic Status, δ = 1.5 and ε = .125 
Variable SES = 1 SES = 2 SES = 3 SES = 4 
1995 – 2000 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School 
0.020 
(0.032) 
0.022 
(0.032) 
0.023 
(0.033) 
0.024 
(0.033) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School, Post-1997 
0.054 
(0.010) 
0.051 
(0.011) 
0.046 
(0.014) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
Number of Observations 90,100 67,611 31,097 10,429 
2007 – 2012 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School 
-0.025 
(0.037) 
-0.025 
(0.037) 
-0.017 
(0.038) 
-0.013 
(0 .042) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a 
Magnet School, Post-2009 
0.147 
(0.024) 
0.145 
(0.026) 
0.109 
(0.036) 
0.085 
(0.047) 
Number of Observations 65,783 50,377 23,572 7,559 
 
Notes.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the log of sale price.  The 
regressions include controls for structural characteristics, the quarter of sale, and census tract fixed 
effects. 
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Table 10. Quantile Regression Results, δ = 1.5 and ε = .125 
 
Variable τ = 0.10 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.90 
Model 1:  1995-2000 (90,100 obs.) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a Magnet School 0.009 (0.011) 
0.032 
(0.003) 
0.034 
(0.005) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a Magnet School, 
Post-1997 
0.060 
(0.014) 
0.028 
(0.004) 
0.043 
(0.007) 
Model 2:  2007-2012 (65,783 obs.) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a Magnet School 0.002 (0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.089 
(0.011) 
Within 1.5 Miles of a Magnet School, 
Post-2009 
0.104 
(0.015) 
0.159 
(0.011) 
0.165 
(0.015) 
Model 3:  1995-2000 (90,100 obs.) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 1 Magnet School 0.035 (0.011) 
0.041 
(0.003) 
0.025 
(0.006) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 2 Magnet Schools -0.150 (0.021) 
0.035 
(0.006) 
0.132 
(0.010) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 3 Magnet Schools -0.099 (0.025) 
-0.073 
(0.008) 
-0.034 
(0.013) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 1 Magnet School, 
Post-1997 
0.062 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.018 
(0.007) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 2 Magnet Schools, 
Post-1997 
0.112 
(0.026) 
0.090 
(0.008) 
0.064 
(0.013) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 3 Magnet Schools, 
Post-1997 
0.142 
(0.031) 
0.121 
(0.009) 
0.120 
(0.016) 
Model 4:  2007-2012 (65,783 obs.) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 1 Magnet School 0.038 (0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.139 
(0.012) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 2 Magnet Schools 0.022 (0.017) 
0.090 
(0.012) 
0.114 
(0.017) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 3 Magnet Schools -0.038 (0.024) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.110 
(0.024) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 1 Magnet School, 
Post-2009 
0.100 
(0.017) 
0.138 
(0.012) 
0.164 
(0.017) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 2 Magnet Schools, 
Post-2009 
-0.025 
(0.026) 
0.080 
(0.018) 
0.202 
(0.025) 
Within 1.5 Miles of 3 Magnet Schools, 
Post-2009 
0.491 
(0.034) 
0.378 
(0.024) 
0.242 
(0.034) 
Notes.  The dependent variable is the log of sale price.  The regressions include controls for structural 
characteristics, time trends, and census tract fixed effects.   
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Magnet School Locations 
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Figure 2. Treatment and Control Definitions  
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Figure 3. Median House Prices over Time (δ = 1.5) 
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Figure 4. Quantile Regression  Coefficients for Treatment, Post-Reform 
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Figure 5. Quantile Estimates of Log Sale Price Distributions within 1.5 Miles of a Magnet 
School 
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Figure 6. Quantile Estimates of Log Sale Price Distributions within 1.5 Miles of a Magnet 
School by Number of Nearby Schools 
 
 
